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Abstract 
Bayes belief networks and influence diagrams are tools for constructing 
coherent probabilistic representations of uncertain expert opinion. The 
construction of such a network with about 30 nodes is used to illustrate a 
variety of techniques which can facilitate the process of structuring and 
quantifying uncertain relationships. These include some generalizations 
of the "noisy OR gate" concept. Sensitivity analysis of generic elements 
of Bayes' networks provides insight into when rough probability 
assessments are sufficient and when greater precision may be 
important. 
1. Introduction 
As the advantages of coherent probabilistic 
schemes for representing uncertainty become 
more widely recognized, there is increasing 
interest in the use of Bayesian belief networks 
and influence diagrams (Howard & Matheson, 
1984, Pearl, 1986, Shachter, 1987, Henrion, 
1987). Influence diagrams have been in use 
for several years by decision analysts as a tool 
to help in constructing simple models (typically 
with less than 8 uncertain and decision 
variables), that can be analyzed by decision 
trees. However, to date there has been a lack 
of published examples of applications 
employing general networks which are 
significantly larger. Doubtless, this is due in 
part to the lack of availability until recently of 
practical algorithms for propagating evidence 
through complex networks. It may also be due 
in part to the difficulties of the knowledge 
engineering: As always, there is a lag 
between the development of the theory and 
the development of practical techniques and 
skills for applying them. 
The goal of this paper is to discuss some 
techniques which can ease the process of 
structuring large networks and quantifying 
probabilistic influences. These will be 
illustrated by their use in the construction of an 
actual belief network and influence diagram of 
moderate size (30 variables). It will use this 
example to illustrate a variety of general 
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techniques for conducting and facilitating the 
knowledge engineering process. It will also 
examine some general issues of analyzing the 
sensitivity of conclusions to errors and 
approximations in assessed probabilities. This 
helps to provide insights about which kinds of 
errors in numerical probability assessments 
are or are not likely to make much difference 
to the results. 
2.The task 
The task involved construction of a system to 
aid in the diagnosis and selection of treatment 
for root disorders of apple trees. This involved 
the encoding of the expert knowledge of a 
plant pathologist with ten years experience as 
a consultant to orchardists on these problems. 
This work was part of an experimental study to 
compare the construction of a rule-based 
expert system with a decision analytic/belief 
net model for the same task. The comparison 
of these two approaches is reported 
elsewhere (Henrion & Cooley, 1987). This 
paper will address only the latter approach. 
There are several possible causes of root 
damage to apple trees, including water stress 
from waterlogged soil, cold stress from severe 
fall or winter, and infection by the fungus, 
phytophthora. These problems often lead to 
damage and destruction of apple trees, and so 
are of major commercial significance to 
orchardists. Abiotic stresses from excess 
water or cold can increase susceptibility to 
phytophthora infection, as well as causing root 
damage themselves. Moderate cases of 
phytophthora can be controlled by applying a 
fungicide. Other treatments include tiling and 
draining the area to control water damage, 
and bridge-grafting. The plant pathologist 
uses a wide variety of evidence to diagnose 
the cause of root damage, and so recommend 
treatments. These include information about 
the tree, e.g. whether its root stock is resistant 
to phytopthora, environmental conditions, e.g. 
recent rain, observable symptoms, e.g. root 
cankers, and laboratory tests. (See Figure 1.) 
3. Structuring the network 
The initial focus was on the decision whether 
to treat the tree with a fungicide which may 
control a phytophthora infection. Choices 
during the knowledge engineering about which 
elements to include in the model and which to 
ignore were made according to whether they 
seemed likely to affect this decision. The first 
part of the model to be elicited was the 
outcome value, expressed as the total dollar 
cost to the orchardist, as affected by the 
decision and the factors that might affect this, 
including the value of the tree, cost of 
treatment, and tree damage due to the various 
disorders. These appear in the lower part of 
Figure 1. 
The diagnostic part of the network links the 
observable data (indicants) with the 
hypothesized, but unobservable root 
disorders. This was elicited progressively 
from the expert, starting with the disorders, 
using questions like "What could affect this? 
What observable results could this have? 
What evidence would you look for?" Each link 
was assigned an arrow according the direction 
of causal influence as judged by the expert. 
The initial structuring segment of the interview 
took about a day. The final results are shown 
in Figure 1. 
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4. Defining levels for variables 
Once an initial network was constructed, the 
next stage was to define the number of levels 
for each variable. Most of the variables are 
intrinsically continuous, but all were 
discretized, most as binary variables, but a 
few with three or four levels. In general, those 
variables which seemed most likely to affect 
the outcome and hence the decision were 
modelled in more detail. For example, 
Eventual-tree-damage was assigned four 
levels {None, Temporary- damage, 
Permanent-damage, Tree-needs-replacing}, 
and the main disorders, including current­
Phytophthora-damage and Abiotic-Stress 
were each assigned three levels, {None, 
Recoverable, Beyond-recovery}. The 
intuitions of the expert about what he finds 
important were also used to help make these 
decisions about discretization. Since the 
complexity of the conditional probability 
distributions needed to express the uncertain 
influences increases rapidly with the number 
of levels, it is critical to keep them well under 
control. 
Each level of each quantity was carefully 
defined. For example, Temporary-damage, 
was defined as 25% reduction in fruit 
production this year, and Permanent-damage 
was defined as 60% reduction this year, and 
15% in all future years. Any tree is deemed 
uneconomic, to be uprooted and replaced, if 
its productivity is permanently impaired by 
more than 25%. Such explicit definitions are 
necessary to avoid ambiguity when assessing 
conditional probabilities. 
5. Quantification of influences 
Influences were quantified as conditional 
probability distributions. Initially qualitative 
judgments were sought about the strength of 
the influences and the relative impacts of 
different parents where there were multiple 
causative factors. Generally, each conditional 
probability was first expressed by a phrase, 
such as "a toss-up", "unlikely", or "impossible". 
Then each was quantified by an approximate 
number, generally from the set {0, .01,.05, .1, 







































Figure 1 :Bayes' network 
and influence diagram 
for diagnosis and treatment 
of apple tree root disorders. 








6. Refinement of model structure 
During the quantification of influences there 
was also further refinement of the network 
whenever it turned out that modifications to 
the structure could make it easier to assess, or 
earlier structural assumptions turned out to be 
mistaken. One important example concerned 
violations of conditional independence. By the 
definition of a Bayes network the successors 
of a node should be conditionally independent 
given that node. If, on further reflection, they 
tum out not to be, then an additional node may 
be required to fix the problem. For example, 
initially the expert judged that Cold Stress in 
Orchard and Reports of Cold Stress in Region 
were both causally influenced by Records of 
Winter Cold Episodes without Snow cover 
(Figure 2a). But the expert later judged that 
they weren't conditionally independent of it. 
However, further discussion of the issues 
revealed that there was a hidden hypothesis 
that there actually was Cold Stress in the 
Region. (See Figure 2b.) This could not be 
observed directly, but might lead to Cold 
Stress in the Orchard and to Reports of Cold 
Stress in the Region, and the latter two were 
judged conditionally independent on this 
variable. As Pearl has suggested, conditional 
independence should not be viewed as an 
awkward constraint on the freedom of the 
knowledge engineer, but rather as a useful 
aid. Where it fails, this is an indication that 
there is a hidden variable, whose introduction 
may greatly ease the assessment process. 
Figure 2a: Initial net- Figure 2b: Additional 
work violating condit- node restores condit­
ional independence. ional independence 
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Another way in which an additional node may 
simplify the assessment process is where two 
factors were judged to have identical effects if 
either or both were present. For example, 
Water-Stress and Winter-Stress at a given 
level were both judged to have the same 
impact on each of the three symptoms, 
Reduced-Root-Hairs, Canker-Margin, Root­
Tissue-Damage, and on increasing 
susceptibility to Phytophthora. (See Figure 1 ). 
Thus an additional variable was defined, 
Abiotic-Stress, which is the conjunction of 
Water-Stress and Winter-Stress. (Actually, 
the level of Abiotic-Stress is defined as the 
maximum of the levels of these two.) Since 
the size of each conditional distribution is 
multiplied by the number of levels of each 
causal factor (three in this case), this 
replacement produced a useful factor of three 
reduction in the difficulty of assessing the 
influences on each of the four impacted 
variables. 
7. Noisy OR gates 
Considerable reduction in effort was also 
obtained by using versions of the "noisy OR 
gate" (Pearl, 1986) generalized for n-ary 
variables. The "noisy OR" influence structure 
applies when there are several possible logical 
causes, x;. i=l,2, ... n of a binary effect variable 
y, where (a) each of which has a probability P; 
of being sufficient to produce the effect in the 
absence of all other causes, and (b) the 
probability of each cause being sufficient is 
independent of the presence of other causes. 
Pearl shows that the probability of y given a 
subset x of the x; which are present: 
















The complete conditional distribution for n I binary predecessors would require the specification of 2" parameters, but if the noisy 
OR assumptions apply, you need specify only 
n, one for each P;· I 
like any model, a Bayes' net is never 
complete, and so there will often be possible 
causes of an effect that are not explicitly 























useful to assess a base rate probability, Po for 
•an other causes•, i.e. the event that the effect 
will occur apparently spontaneously in the 
absence of any of the causes modelled 
explicitly. If the expert assesses the 
probability that each explicit predecessor is 
sufficient to cause the effect variable in the 
absence of any other explicit cause, the 
numbers need readjustment to obtain the 
foi1Tl.lla for the probability of y: 
1-p. 
p(yiX) = 1-(1-Po>· n _, i·x1e x 1-po 
A potential example of a noisy OR gate with a 
base rate probability occurs in Late-Season­
Growth, of the apple tree, (which renders the 
tree more susceptible to Cold-Stress) which is 
influenced by Late-Pruning, Late-Fertilization, 
or a Warm-Fall. (See right top of Figure 1.) 
Originally this influence was assessed 
completely by obtaining the probability of the 
effect conditional on each of the eight 
combinations of its three binary causal 
influences. The distribution obtained was: 
P.J:UJU.ng No 'lea 
Waz:m fall No Yea No Yea 
Late No .1 . 6  .8 • 9 
l'ez:til Yea .8 • 9 
• 9 1 
Instead, this could have been modelled as a 
noisy OR with base rate po=0.1, and 
sufficiency probabilities for each of the three 
possible causes alone to match the three 
specified. This would have required only four 
instead of eight numerical assessments. The 
resulting conditional distribution is almost 
identical for most purposes: 
Pruning No Yea 
Waxm fall No Yea No Yea 
Late No .1 .6 .8 . 91 
rez:ti1 rea .8 . 91 .96 . 98 
The noisy OR influence can be generalized to 
apply to cases with multi-valued variables. 
For example, the observable symptom 
reduced fine root hairs (binary) can be 
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produced by any of the three disorders Other­
root-problems, Abiotic-stress, or Phytopthora, 
the latter two of which have three different 
levels. The entire conditional distribution has 
2x3x3 =18 independent parameters. If we 
assume that the probability that each level of 
each disorder is sufficient to cause Reduced­
fine-root-hairs is independent of the other two 
disorders, then we have a simple extension of 
a noisy OR. In this case Other disorders is 
modelled explicitly, and so the base probability 
in the absence of any of the three classes of 
disorder is zero. The full distribution may be 
assessed given the probability that each of the 
levels other than •none· of each input is 
sufficient to cause the symptom, i.e. 1 +2+2=5 
parameters. Again the conditional distribution 
generated by these was very similar to the 
numbers actually assessed. The largest 
difference was 0.15, and the standard 
deviation was 0.06. 
The notion of the noisy OR can be further 
generalized to deal with effect variables with 
multiple levels. For example, consider the 
symptom "observable tissue-damage", which 
has four levels, {none, low, moderate, severe}, 
and is influenced by the same three disorders 
as "reduced fine root hairs". In effect one can 
treat an n-ary variable as n-1 binary variables . 
The resulting value for the effect variable is 
the maximum of the levels produced by each 
of its influencing variables. Thus.for example, 
Observable-tissue-damage is assumed to be 
severe if any of the three disorders is sufficient 
to cause severe damage. Notice, that no 
interaction is assumed, so that if all three 
disorders are sufficient to cause moderate 
damage, then the net result is moderate. In 
this case the complete conditional distribution 
has 3x3x3x2=54 free parameters, but with this 
extended noisy OR assumption, only 10 
numbers needed to be assessed. Again the 
probabilities generated from these were very 
similar to those assessed directly . 
8. Model testing and refinement 
A set of 8 typical orchard scenarios, each with 
a set of observed values for some or all of the 
indicant variables were constructed by the 
expert for testing of the system. These 
include some which are relatively easy with 
strong evidence for a single diagnosis, and 
some which are harder with weak or 
conflicting evidence. For the easy cases, we 
should certainly expect the system to come up 
with a similar conclusion to the expert. But for 
the hard cases, they may come to different 
conclusions, either because the expert is 
using knowledge not properly represented in 
the model, or because the expert's reasoning 
under uncertainty is faulty relative to the 
system, which is based on a normative theory. 
The findings of behavioral decision theory 
suggest that human judgment under 
uncertainty will typically be error-prone where 
we must reason beyond direct experience. 
This study revealed a clear example of such a 
conflict between the intuition of the expert and 
the inferences of the system: The expert's 
judgment about the expected value of the 
fungicide treatment for some typical scenarios 
turned out to be a significant overestimate. 
Detailed examination and explanation of the 
reasoning of the system convinced the expert 
that the system was in fact correct, and 
consequently he gained new insight into the 
problem and modified his intuition. This case 
is described in more detail in (Henrion & 
Cooley, 1987). 
9. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is useful to discover the 
relative importance of different indicants 
(symptoms, environmental conditions and 
other observable factors) in arriving at a 
diagnosis and hence in selecting the decision. 
It is also useful during the construction of the 
network and quantification of influences to 
help identify . what parts of the model and 
which parameters may be critical and which 
are less likely to be important to the results. In 
this way it can provide a guide for allocation of 
the effort in knowledge engineering towards 
the most important elements. 
One useful measure of sensitivity to predictive 
or causal evidence is the sensitivity range of 
the probability of an event y with respect to an 
event x. Suppose e is an assessment error 
(viewed as an event) which might affect the 
assessment of the probability of x, giving 
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p{xle). Suppose that y is conditionally 
independent of e given x. Then the sensitivity 
range is defined as the derivative of p(yle) with 
respect to p(xle): 
SR(y,x) = dp(yle) 
dp{xle) 
Given conditional independence, so that 
p(ylx) 









So, it turns out that the sensitivity range is 
equal to the maximum possible change in the 
probability of y which can be caused by error e 
as p(xle) varies from 0 to 1. 
Since a sensitivity range is a difference 
between two probabilities, its absolute 
magnitude cannot be greater than one. If the 
link is non-deterministic, then it must be strictly 
less than one: 
ISR(y,x)l< 1 [2] 
Consequently the effect of any error in judging 
a probability of a causal or predictive variable 
cannot be greater than the magnitude of the 
error. Thus errors in probability assessment 
cannot be "amplified" by the model. In general 
they will be attenuated as the number of 
cascaded uncertain inferences is increased. 
Suppose we have a causal chain: 
e _. xl -+ x2 - -+ xn 
It is easy to show that the sensitivity range of 
the end of a chain with respect to an error in 
the probability p(x11e) is simply the product of 
the sensitivity ranges f9r each of the 
intermediate links: 
lt-1 
SR(x,.,x1) = n SR(xi+l•x;). [3] 
j 
We may also consider the potential impact in 
errors in assessments of the link probabilities, 
p(x;+11xJ Since the absolute sensitivity range 
for each link must be less than unity if it is 
non-determistic, each link serves to dilute the 
impact of all the others, whether they come 







































intuition that the longer a chain of uncertain 
reasoning, the more tenuous the results. For 
example, consider the upper right-hand corner 
of the influence diagram in Figure 1. Late 
pruning could lead to late season growth, 
which could in turn lead to cold stress in the 
orchard, and hence to cold stress in the tree. 
Each step adds additional uncertainty, and the 
resulting degree of belief in cold stress in the 
tree will not be very sensitive to changes in the 
prior on late pruning or on any of the link 
probabilities. 
However, things can be a little different for 
diagnostic links. Suppose A influences B, 
A---+ B 
Suppose we define the odds of a as O(a), and 
the likelihood ratio: 
L(b,a) =p(bla). 
p(blli) 
We can then restate Bayes' theorem in this 
form: 
(alb)= L(b,a).O(a) . [6] p 
L(b, a).O(a) + 1 
We take the derivative of this posterior with 







(L(b,a).O(a) + ll 
[7] 
This sensitivity can get large when O(a) is 
large and L(b, a) is small. 
We can illustrate this from the apple tree 
example with the relationship between Cold 
stress in region and reports of cold stress in 
region, which we will identify as A and B 
respectively. (Note that B means no reports.) 
Suppose we already know information c, that 
there was a warm Fall and that there were 
recorded cold episodes without snow cover, 
but have not yet sought any other information. 
According to the probabilities provided by the 
expert, cold stress in the region is almost 
certain, p(alc)= 0.95. The expert also judged 
that the probability of no reports given cold 
stress in the region is extremely small, and the 
probability of reports given no cold stress is 
very large: p(bla)= 0.025,p(bla)= 0.95. Hence 
the Likelihood ratio is small, L(b,a)= 0.026. If, 
138 
when we ask, we find there have been no 
reports of cold stress, then from [7] the 
posterior for cold stress is less likely than not, 
p(alb)=0.33. On the other hand, if the expert 
had judged the probability of no reports given 
cold stress to be a little higher, say p(bla)=O.l, 
then the posterior would be more likely than 
not, p(alb)=0.67. In other words a 0.075 
increase in the conditional probability (and 
similar increase in likelihood ratio) leads to a 
0.33 increase in the posterior, a sensitivity 
factor of 4.4. It is interesting to note that this 
sensitivity arises where two sources of 
evidence are in conflict (in this case the 
weather history conflicts with the absence of 
reports of cold stress). If both sources 
supported the same conclusion it would not 
occur. 
We should also recognize that this small 
increase in absolute terms, corresponds to a 
factor of 4 increase in relative terms. The 
odds-likelihood form of Bayes' theorem shows 
that this fourfold increase in the likelihood 
leads to a fourfold increase in the posterior 
odds. A good argument can be made that the 
magnitude of errors or vagueness in assessed 
probabilities is not uniform for probabilities 
between 0 and 1. Uniform vagueness in log­
odds seems more reasonable . Applying this 
transform to Bayes' theorem we obtain the 
posterior Jog-odds as the sum of the prior log­
odds and the Jog-likelihood ratio: 
Ln[O(alb)] =Ln[O(a)] +Ln[L(b,a)] 
In this metric the sensitivity of the posterior to 
error in the link strength (expressed as log­
likelihood or evidence weight), is always unity. 
Sensitivity to error in the prior is also unity. 
This discussion also underlines the 
importance of the distinction between almost 
certain and absolutely certain: Assigning 0 or 
1 can have a drastically different effect than 
assigning 0.01 or 0.99 say. 
10. Conclusions 
This example at least demonstrates the 
feasibility of the knowledge engineering in 
constructing a Bayes' net or influence diagram 
of moderate size. Like more conventional 
knowledge engineering with rule-based 
inference schemes, it is a demanding process. 
However, I have used it to illustrate a number 
of techniques which can make it considerably 
easier both for the knowledge engineer and 
the domain expert, and which may help to 
improve the reliability of the result. 
There is no doubt still considerable scope for 
developing additional skills and techniques to 
further facilitate the process. In particular, 
there are a number of ways in which improved 
software tools could help greatly. Graphic 
programs for entering and editing influence 
diagrams directly, such as David (Shachter, 
1986) and Demaps (Wiecha, 1986) can 
considerably facilitate the structuring process. 
Provision of built-in facilities for specifying 
noisy OR gates and their extensions could 
further speed the encoding of influences with 
many parent variables. Still more useful would 
be facilities to support dynamic sensitivity 
analysis of results to uncertainty and 
vagueness in assessed probabilities for 
plausible ranges of scenarios, to guide the 
construction process to focus on those parts of 
the model that are demonstrably most critical. 
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